The Deleuzian Revolution: Ten Innovations in Difference and Repetition by Smith, Daniel W.
The Deleuzian Revolution: Ten Innovations
in Difference and Repetition
Daniel W. Smith Purdue University
Abstract
Difference and Repetition might be said to have brought about a
Deleuzian Revolution in philosophy comparable to Kant’s Copernican
Revolution. Kant had denounced the three great terminal points of
traditional metaphysics – self, world and God – as transcendent illusions,
and Deleuze pushes Kant’s revolution to its limit by positing a
transcendental field that excludes the coherence of the self, world and
God in favour of an immanent and differential plane of impersonal
individuations and pre-individual singularities. In the process, he
introduces numerous conceptual innovations into philosophy: the
becoming of concepts; a transformation of the form of the question;
an insistence that philosophy must start in the middle; an attempt to
think in terms of multiplicities; the development of a new logic and a
new metaphysics based on a concept of difference; a new conception
of space as intensive rather than extensive; a conception of time as a
pure and empty form; and an understanding of philosophy as a system
in heterogenesis – that is, a system that entails a perpetual genesis of the
heterogeneous, an incessant production of the new.
Keywords: concepts, becoming, multiplicity, singularity, the middle,
difference, intensity, time, system, the new
What Deleuze said about Spinoza is also true of himself: alongside
the systematic or conceptual reading of his work there is also an
affective reading in which one is carried along by the text without
necessarily comprehending its concepts. An affective reading, Deleuze
suggests, is ‘an encounter, a passion’ that produces ‘a set of affects, a
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kinetic determination, an impulse’, but not necessarily a philosophical
comprehension, which may come much later (Deleuze 2001: 129–30).
This was certainly my experience in reading Difference and Repetition.
In both style and content, the book was unlike any other philosophical
text I had been reading. Although I was initially drawn in by themes
such as difference, the overturning of Platonism, and the critique of the
‘dogmatic’ image of thought, many other concepts in the book remained
opaque to me. Still, reading the book produced a powerful affect, a
sense that the thinking contained on its pages was worth delving into,
deeply, though I could not have said why, exactly. Now, years later,
after reading and rereading Difference and Repetition, I have perhaps
gained a better conceptual comprehension of the book, though with the
inevitable caveat that it still holds many untapped riches.
If one could speak of a Deleuzian Revolution, in parallel with
Kant’s Copernican Revolution, it is a revolution that is resolutely post-
Kantian. In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant had critiqued the Ideas
of the Soul, the World and God as the three great terminal points of
traditional metaphysics: a single substantial self (Soul), a totality of
things (World) and a first cause of this totality (God) are all denounced
as transcendent illusions. Deleuze takes this rejection of traditional
metaphysics seriously. Against the canonical post-Kantians, from Fichte
to Hegel, who were quick to restore metaphysics, Deleuze instead posits
a transcendental field that excludes the coherence of the self, world and
God in favour of an immanent and differential plane of impersonal
individuations and pre-individual singularities – though this will entail
a new and quite different type of metaphysics (Deleuze 2004: 137).
In elaborating this revolution, Deleuze at the same time introduces a
number of profound innovations into philosophy. To mark the fiftieth
anniversary of the book’s publication, I would like to list ten such
innovations that can be found in the pages of Difference and Repetition,
though the list is inevitably idiosyncratic, compressed and incomplete.
I. The Becoming of Concepts
Difference and Repetition exemplifies what it states: it develops a
philosophy of difference, but the concepts it proposes to express this
philosophy of difference are themselves differential. While the concepts
have a consistency (endo- and exo-), they do not have an identity – or
rather, their identity is a secondary effect (Deleuze and Guattari 1994:
19–20). There is nothing more foreign to Deleuze than adopting a
‘position’ on a given topic, since thought is always in movement.
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Deleuze’s concept of intensity is a case in point. In Difference and
Repetition, the concept is developed in relation to the notion of depth.
In Logic of Sense, the concept of intensity is retained, but it is instead
linked to the notion of surface: same concept, new components. In Anti-
Oedipus, the concept undergoes a third mutation: rising and falling
intensities are now events that take place on a body without organs
(Deleuze 2006: 65–6). All of Deleuze’s concepts pass through similar
‘becomings’. Deleuze and Guattari said that they ‘never did understand
the “body without organs” in quite the same way’, which means that
even a single concept has a different trajectory (it differs from itself)
depending on whether it is traced through Deleuze’s work or Guattari’s
work. The effect of working with Guattari, Deleuze said, was to produce
‘a proliferation, an accumulation of bifurcations’ (Deleuze 2006: 239).
The same is true more broadly within the history of philosophy. Kant
famously appropriated Plato’s concept of the ‘Idea’ in the Critique of
Pure Reason and gave it a new set of components, and Deleuze will
do exactly the same in the fourth chapter of Difference and Repetition,
taking the baton from Plato and Kant but turning the Idea into a concept
that is immanent, differential and problematic.
This then is a first revolution: Deleuze introduces time into the form
of concepts. Concepts are not eternal and timeless (true in all times and
all places), but are created, invented, produced in response to shifting
problematics. In a sense, Deleuze is incorporating into philosophy the
transformation that occurred in geology with the discovery of ‘deep
time’. Mt. Everest, though it appears to be an ‘object’, is in fact the
ongoing actualisation of a complex set of processes, which includes the
folding of the earth’s crust, the pressure of the Indian tectonic plate
on the Eurasian plate, the erosion and glaciation of the Himalayan
range, and so on. Deleuze’s concepts have a similar status, which makes
the reading of his corpus particularly demanding. It is never sufficient
to ‘define’ a concept; one must consider its constitution, trace its
movements, chart its trajectories, follow its becoming. ‘There is nothing
that does not lose its identity,’ Deleuze writes, ‘when the dynamic space
and time of its actual constitution is discovered’ (Deleuze 1994: 218–19).
II. The Form of the Question (Problematics)
But concepts are never created willy-nilly: they are solutions to shifting
problematics, responses to variable questions. Socrates set philosophy on
a particular trajectory when he insisted on the priority of the question
‘What is . . . ?’, which presupposed a certain conception of essence.
Ten Innovations in Difference and Repetition 37
Socrates famously ridiculed interlocutors who responded to the ‘What
is . . . ?’ question by citing examples: one cannot answer the question
‘What is beauty?’ by noting who is beautiful (‘a young virgin’) just as
one cannot answer the question ‘What is justice?’ by pointing where or
when there is justice, and one cannot reach the essence of the dyad by
explaining how ‘two’ is obtained, and so on. Plato wanted to oppose
the question ‘What is . . . ?’ to all other forms of questioning – such as
Who? Which one? How many? How? Where? When? In which case?
From what point of view? –which were criticised as minor and vulgar
questions of opinion that express confused ways of thinking. Yet it is not
clear that the question ‘What is . . . ?’ is a legitimate and well-formulated
question, even for discovering essence, and Deleuze’s second revolution
is a profound critique of the ‘What is . . . ?’ question, and a reassessment
of ‘the question-problem’ complex as a condition of thought.1
The philosopher, famously, is not a wise man but rather a friend or
lover of wisdom (philo-sophos): wisdom is something to which he lays
claim but does not actually possess. But who is it that actually seeks
wisdom or searches for the truth? Is it the friend, exercising a voluntary
desire for the truth, in dialogue with others, mutually exploring a ‘What
is . . . ?’ question? Or is it not rather, as Proust suggested, something
akin to a jealous lover, who is involuntarily compelled to confront a
problem whose coordinates are discovered, not by posing the question
‘What is jealousy?’, but through precisely the types of minor questions
that Plato rejected: What happened? When? Where? How? With whom?
Why? (Deleuze 2000: 15–17). This shift in the form of questioning is an
example of Deleuze’s more wide-ranging concern with the ontological
status of problems. Problems are not subjective obstacles we need to
overcome on our way to knowledge but objective realities that exist
in the world. Deleuze will provide a rigorous analysis of problems in
his study of differential equations, particularly in the case of problems
without solution: the existence and distribution of singularities in a
problem is of another nature than the forms of the integral curves in
their neighbourhood (the solution) (Deleuze 2004: 87). But the import
of his enquiry is far more generalisable. Deleuze once said he considered
himself to be a ‘pure metaphysician’ (Villani 1999: 130). If metaphysics
asks, ‘What is the nature of reality?’ Deleuze’s response is that reality
has the structure of a problem. ‘Being qua being’ always presents itself
under a problematic form, as a series of problematisations that are
initially experienced as a kind of shock that does violence to thought.
Philosophical concepts, scientific functions and even artistic productions
are solutions to these problems, but it is the structure of the problem
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that imposes the ‘claws of necessity’ on their production – a kind of
imperative that is problematic rather than categorical.
III. Philosophy Starts in the Middle, Au Milieu
The third revolution follows from this: philosophy always starts in the
middle, and not at the beginning or at the end. It is striking how often
it is presumed that philosophy is teleological: its purpose is to offer
an end or a goal to work towards, an Ideal to strive for. Deleuze and
Guattari published a book called Capitalism and Schizophrenia, wrote a
‘Treatise on Nomadology’ and proposed a concept of the virtual, and
the response of some readers is to say, ‘Deleuze and Guattari think
we should all become virtual, or become nomads or schizophrenics.’
Conversely, philosophers themselves often look for starting points rather
than end points, such as the first principle or fundamental axiom from
which everything else can be derived. Deleuze, by contrast, insists that
philosophy must start neither at the beginning nor at the end, but rather
in the middle. Philosophy has neither arche nor telos, neither principle
nor finality, but is always au milieu.2
This approach to philosophy is perhaps most evident in Deleuze’s
reading of Spinoza (Deleuze 1990), which was published in 1968,
the same year as Difference and Repetition. Spinoza’s first principle
is well known: a single substance (God or Nature) having an infinity
of attributes. But there are also third, fourth and fifth principles: one
Nature for all bodies, one Nature for all individuals, a Nature that is
itself an individual varying in any infinite number of ways. What is at
issue is no longer the theoretical affirmation of a single substance but
the practical laying out of a single ‘plane of immanence’ in the midst of
which all bodies, all minds and all individuals (finite modes) are situated
(Deleuze 1988: 122). To be in the middle of Spinoza is to install oneself
on this plane, which implies a way of living, a mode of life. Deleuze’s
interpretation of Spinoza thus begins in the middle in two ways.
Exegetically, his analysis initially ‘starts’ with the third of the five books
of the Ethics, which develops the theme of affectivity. Ontologically, it
focuses on the analysis of finite modes, which are constituted by two axes
of affectivity: the longitude of affections (affectio) and the latitude of
affects (affectus), through which one can construct a kind of map of the
body. Taken together, these longitudes and latitudes constitute Nature,
the plane of immanence, which is always variable and is constantly being
composed and decomposed by individuals and collectivities. Deleuze’s
approach to Spinoza is generalisable to all his works. We are so used to
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thinking in terms of beginnings and endings, origins and finalities (Where
are you coming from? Where are you going?) that we still find it difficult
to think ‘in the middle’. This is the significance of Deleuze and Guattari’s
concept of the rhizome, which has no beginning or end, but is always in
the middle, between things, inter-being, intermezzo (Deleuze and Parnet
1987: 28–30).
IV. Thinking in Terms of Multiplicities
What then does one find in the middle? Deleuze’s response: multiplicities
(or manifolds). Here again, a pertinent example of a multiplicity can be
found in Deleuze’s analysis of Spinoza’s physics. In the Ethics, Spinoza
attempts to determine what the ‘simplest body’ in physics might be, and
Deleuze outlines three possible responses: the finite, the indefinite and the
infinite. The first approach presumes that the analysis of matter is finite:
one eventually reaches a limit where matter can no longer be divided,
and this limit is the atom (a-, ‘not’ + temnein, ‘to cut’, that which can
no longer be cut). The formula of the indefinite is that, no matter how
far one pushes the analyses, the term one arrives at can always in turn
be divided and analysed: the analysis never stops, and there is never a
final or ultimate term (indefinite regress). But the viewpoint of actual
infinity that Spinoza develops is neither finite nor indefinite. On the one
hand, there are indeed ultimate or final terms that can no longer be
divided without changing their nature – thus it is against the indefinite.
On the other hand, however, these ultimate terms go to infinity – thus
they are not atoms but rather ‘infinitely small terms’, or as Newton
put it, ‘vanishing’ terms. In other words, the terms of an actual infinity
are smaller than any given quantity, and therefore can never be treated
numerically; they can only exist collectively (and not distributively)
as infinite collections. Spinoza’s conclusion is extraordinary: there are
no simple bodies; or rather, the simplest bodies in Nature are actual
infinities.3 In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze will develop his own
vocabulary to describe multiplicities: differential relations, determinable
elements, singularities, series, problematics, the virtual and so on.
One of the consequences of taking multiplicities as ‘the real minimum
unit’ (Deleuze and Parnet 1987: 51) is that it implies a profound
reorientation of the relation among the sciences. This can be seen clearly
in the work of Raymond Ruyer, the philosopher of science who Deleuze
cites frequently in Difference and Repetition. Ruyer had proposed his
own term for multiplicities, absolute forms, and he sharply criticised the
reductionist presumption that physical particles are the ‘building blocks’
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of reality. This is an image derived from technical artefacts: we fashion
complex buildings out of bricks, and we analogically presume that the
universe must likewise be built out of simple building blocks, such as
atoms or particles. As a result, there is an equally common assumption,
which persisted from Descartes through Comte, that physics is the most
fundamental of the sciences, with chemistry, biology, psychology and the
human sciences following behind. Ruyer lamented that ‘we continue to
believe in a poorly defined primacy of the molecular and the elementary’
(Ruyer 2016: 155), a primacy that is belied by the sciences themselves.
Starting in the middle, with multiplicities (or absolute forms), entails
a new distribution of the sciences. For Ruyer, absolute forms include
molecules, viruses, cells, embryos and brains, and what he called ‘molar
structures’ are statistical aggregates of these individual forms, such as
clouds, gases, crowds or geological formations. The primary sciences
will thus be those that deal with absolute forms (quantum physics,
embryology), while the sciences that only study individuals from their
molar or statistical side are necessarily relegated to a secondary status
(classical physics, population biology). Deleuze was animated by a
similar inspiration throughout his works, particularly in his appeals to
biology and embryology in Difference and Repetition.
V. Towards a New Concept of Logic
Deleuze speaks of logic throughout his works, and multiplicities
inevitably require a new type of logic. If we think of the term ‘logic’
(logos) as referring broadly to a symbolism or ‘regime of signs’, it
is evident that the concept of the logos is itself a multiplicity, with
its own becomings. Modern chemistry, for instance, has developed a
complex symbolisation to model molecules that bears little resemblance
to traditional logic.4 Musical notation is similarly a highly formal regime
of signs.5 For its part, propositional logic is a symbolism for analysing
the relation between statements (arguments) and is a formalisation of
natural language. Moreover, it is based on the principle of identity
(A is A) and its two supplementary principles: the principle of non-
contradiction (A is not non-A) and the principle of the excluded middle
(either A or not-A). We presume, for example, that a variable x
must remain identical to itself throughout all the operations that are
performed on it. In a sense, we constantly violate the principle of identity
when we say A is B (the sky is blue), which is why philosophy was forced
to save the principle of identity by distinguishing between a substance
and its attributes, or between a subject and its predicates (properties).
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Yet it is not by chance that the ‘mathematisation’ of Nature, which
lies at the heart of the so-called scientific revolution, took place with the
development of an entirely new type of symbolism invented by Leibniz
and Newton, namely, differential calculus. Today, ‘laws’ of Nature are
almost always expressed in the form of differential equations. (Both
Spinoza and Nietzsche hesitated to speak of laws of nature, since ‘law’
is a social and moral concept.)6 Unlike propositional logic, which is a
symbolism for the relation between statements, calculus is a symbolism
for the exploration of existence. This is why, in the nineteenth century,
philosophies of Nature from Maimon to Novalis often took the form
of explorations into the metaphysics of the calculus. Deleuze is certainly
a heritor of this tradition, and to some degree he uses the symbolism
of calculus as a model for examining the ‘logic of multiplicities’,
although he prefers to speak of a dialectic of the calculus rather than
a metaphysics, following the work of Albert Lautman (Lautman 2011).
Other domains of mathematics play a similar role in Deleuze’s attempt
to conceptualise a logic of multiplicities, including group theory (Abel,
Galois), topology and non-Euclidean manifolds (Riemann). The ‘group’
of an equation, for instance, captures the conditions of the problem, and
they allowed Galois to show that certain equations (such as a general
solution for the ‘quintic’) were unsolvable. What is significant is that the
new type of logic Deleuze is attempting to develop in Difference and
Repetition entails a movement from a principle of identity to a concept
of difference.
VI. Difference as a Pure Relation
If ‘logicism’ tried to reduce mathematics to logic, and thus to the
principle of identity, Difference and Repetition moves in the opposite
direction, developing a logic derived from a concept of difference.
Bertrand Russell noted that, in contemporary science, the differential
relation had replaced the old metaphysical ‘law of causality’, and
the fourth chapter of Difference and Repetition can be read as an
elaboration of Russell’s claim.7 Deleuze does not critique the principle
of identity as such, but rather argues that the relation of difference
(dx/dy) is prior to the relation of identity (x = x), at least with regard
to the exploration of the real. The differential relation, as it appears
in calculus, can be distinguished from fractional relations and algebraic
relations. Already in fractions, there appears a kind of independence of
the relation from its terms, since in the fraction 2/3, for example, there
is no assignable whole number which, when multiplied by three, equals
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two – even if we can decide, by convention, to treat fractions as numbers
(subject to rules of addition, multiplication, etc.), and to treat numbers
as fractions (we can write 2 as 4 / 2 or 6 / 3). In a fractional relation, the
relation is nonetheless between two terms, and a determinate value must
be assigned to the terms; that is, the terms must be given and specified
(2 and 3). In algebraic equations, such as x2 + y2 –R2 = 0, relations
acquire a higher degree of independence from fractional relations, since
a determinate value no longer needs to be assigned to the terms, which
are variables. Nonetheless, although the relation is independent of any
particular value of the terms, it is not independent of the determinable
value of the variable.8
The differential relation constitutes the third step in this history of
relations (Deleuze 2004: 176). In the differential relation dx/dy, dy
in relation to y is equal to zero and dx in relation to x is equal
to zero – they are ‘infinitely small’ quantities (Leibniz) or ‘vanishing’
quantities (Newton).9 It is thus possible to write, as was done frequently
in the seventeenth century, that dx/dy = 0/0. Yet the relation 0/0 is
not equal to zero; in the differential relation, the relation subsists even
when the terms disappear. In this case, the terms between which the
relation is established are neither determined, nor even determinable;
the terms themselves have neither existence, nor value, nor signification
(Deleuze 2004: 176). The only thing that is determined is the reciprocal
relation between the ‘vanishing’ terms (Deleuze will ascribe them a new
modal status: virtual terms), yet the relation between these vanishing
quantities is not equal to zero, but refers to a third term that has a
finite value: dx/dy = z. Applied to a circle, for example, the differential
relation dx/dy tells us something about a third thing, a trigonometric
tangent. We can say that z is the limit of the differential relation, or
that the differential relation tends towards a limit. When the terms of
the relation disappear, the relation subsists because it tends towards a
limit, z. This is the basis of the differential calculus as it was interpreted
in the seventeenth century – an interpretation that was identical to the
comprehension of an actual infinity. Weierstrass and Russell would
eventually give the calculus a static and ordinal interpretation, which
liberated the calculus from any reference to infinitesimals and integrated
it into a pure logic of relations.10
VII. A New Metaphysics (of Difference)
Deleuze thus attempts to develop a new logic (of multiplicities) based
on a concept of difference (the differential relation), which must be
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understood as a pure relation. Taken together, these constitute the
fundamental revolution brought about in Difference and Repetition in
developing a philosophy of difference. ‘We oppose x to not-A,’ Deleuze
would write, ‘the symbol of difference (Differenzphilosophie) to that of
contradiction’ (Deleuze 1994: 170). In attempting to think ‘difference
in itself’ (the title of the book’s first chapter), Deleuze is attempting
to think a pure relation that is not subordinate to its terms, and that
persists even when its terms disappear. Normally we think of difference
as an empirical relation between two things that have a prior identity
(‘x is different from y’), but Deleuze takes the concept of difference to a
properly transcendental level: the differential relation is not only external
to its terms (Bertrand Russell’s empiricist dictum), but it also conditions
or determines its terms. In other words, the differential relation becomes
constitutive of identity: difference becomes productive and genetic. If
Plato found in Euclidean geometry a model of static and self-identical
essences, Deleuze finds in the calculus a model of pure difference, and
thus a transformation in the corresponding theory of Ideas.
In this sense, a philosophy of difference is radically opposed to
a philosophy of substance, since a substance is always a term, an
identity. Deleuze said that he had little sympathy with the positivist and
Heideggerian themes of the ‘death’ of metaphysics or the ‘overcoming’
of metaphysics.11 Like Bergson, he conceived the task of philosophy as
the creation of a metaphysics that was adequate to contemporary science
and mathematics. If the old metaphysics was inadequate, then that is a
problem that should generate a new metaphysics. The ‘old’ metaphysics
might be captured in concepts such as substance, attribute, property,
predicate, causality, universals, possibility, God, world, self and so forth.
In Deleuze’s ‘new’ metaphysics, these are replaced with an entirely new
set of concepts: difference, singularity, series, divergence, problematic,
multiplicity, virtuality, intensity and so on. Yet the demarcation is not
strict, since there are numerous concepts Deleuze appropriates from
the old metaphysics – such as Idea and essence –while assigning new
components to them. In the end, if Deleuze appropriates concepts from
domains such as mathematics and biology, it is not because he is a
philosopher of mathematics or a philosopher of biology, but rather
because he uses them to develop a properly philosophical concept of
difference. This is what Deleuze means, in Difference and Repetition,
when he says that relations such as identity, analogy, opposition and
resemblance are all secondary effects of prior relations of difference.
These four concepts mark the points of tension in Aristotle’s conception
of difference as summarised in Porphyry’s tree, and they are derived from
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a famous thesis that Aristotle held concerning difference: different things
differentiate themselves only through what they have in common.12
Deleuze in effect inverts Aristotle’s formula: difference ‘must relate
the different to the different without any mediation whatsoever by
the identical, the similar, the analogous or the opposed’ (Deleuze
1994: 117).
VIII. Intensity as a Pure Spatium
The eighth revolution concerns the notion of space, which Difference
and Repetition presents as intensive. The concept of intensity is
obviously directed against traditional characterisations of space as
extensive, but it remains one of Deleuze’s most complex concepts,
touching on numerous domains, from biology and philosophy to
mathematics and politics. In biology, an egg is an intensive field (a
body without organs) defined solely by axes and vectors, gradients and
thresholds, displacements and migrations, but it is this intensive field
that gives rise to the extensive space of the organism, with its complex
organisation of organs. The extensive finds its condition in the intensive,
although Simondon noted that even the extended body has a topological
structure that cannot be adequately represented in a Euclidean fashion.
(The digestive tract, for instance, is an exterior milieu around which
the body is folded) (Simondon 2005: 225–8). Moreover, our affective
life, with its manic rises and depressive falls, similarly constitutes an
intensive body that is coextensive with the extended organic body.
In philosophy, it was Hermann Cohen who emphasised the role of
intensive quantities in his reinterpretation of Kantianism, and on this
score Deleuze was strongly influenced by Jules Vuillemin’s reading of
Cohen.13 The empirical difference between extensive magnitudes and
intensive magnitudes has often been emphasised. If I pour together
two separate gallons of water that each have a temperature of fifty
degrees, the volume of water will now be two gallons, but the
temperature will remain the same. This is because extensive magnitudes
are additive (a part–whole relation) whereas intensive magnitudes are
not. What distinguishes two intensive quantities is the variable distance
through which one comprehends their relation to zero intensity (a
zero–unit relation), although these distances are non-decomposable. If
the temperature of the initial gallons of water are forty and sixty degrees,
that difference in temperature will be ‘cancelled’ when the gallons are
mixed, producing a temperature of fifty degrees. Deleuze, following
Cohen, gives a ‘transcendental’ status to intensity as the real condition
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of extensive space: intensity implicates a depth or distance (difference
of potential) that is explicated in extensive space, and as such intensity
becomes a genuine principle of the genesis of space rather than merely an
anticipation of perception, as in Kant. ‘There is a step-by-step, internal,
dynamic construction of space which must precede the “representation”
of the whole as a form of exteriority. The element of this internal genesis
seems to us to consist of intensive quantity’ (Deleuze 1994: 26).
The idea that space is not a ‘given’ but is subject to a plural genesis
not only allows Deleuze to give an account of mathematical constructs
such as topological spaces and n-dimensional manifolds (see Delanda
2001: 9–41). It also accounts for the plurality of spatial concepts
he has developed in his own works, such as the distinction between
optic, manual, tactile and haptic spaces in his analysis of painting in
Francis Bacon (Deleuze 2003) or the famous distinction between smooth
space and striated space in A Thousand Plateaus (Deleuze and Guattari
1987). One could likewise read Capitalism and Schizophrenia as an
extension of this genetic conception of space into the socio-political
sphere, since social formations are analysed by Deleuze and Guattari as
ways of constituting space: states create a striated space as a mechanism
of capture; nomadic war machines occupy a smooth space; cities
create a polarised space of entries and exits; ecumenical organisations
create an encompassing space that integrates heterogeneous formations;
capitalism functions within circuits of an abstract space determined by
labour and capital, and so on. All these spaces coexist within our current
social multiplicity, and the concepts Deleuze and Guattari develop in
Capitalism and Schizophrenia provide tools for distinguishing the lines
and dimensions of the multiple spaces we now co-inhabit.
IX. The Pure and Empty Form of Time
Deleuze brings about a similar transformation with regard to time. For
the ancients, time was a measure of movement: a year measures the
movement of the earth around the sun; a day measures the movement
of the earth on its axis. The ancients were thus led to ask if there was
some time immobile, or at least a most perfect movement, through which
all other movements could be measured (the problem of calendars).
Deleuze argues that, in Kant, time was for the first time liberated
from movement, and became independent and autonomous. Time was
transformed into what Deleuze calls a ‘pure and empty form’: a pure
variability characterised by determinations that take shape and vanish
at an infinite speed without any relation to each other (Deleuze and
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Guattari 1994: 42). The form of time is not an eternal form, in a Platonic
sense, but rather the pure form of what is not eternal, or pure change.
What we call time – both objective and subjective time – is a synthetic
operation that is able to retain the first determination when the second
one appears (habit), since without this operation one could not even
say ‘before’ and ‘after’, or ‘first’ and ‘second’, or that there has been
a ‘repetition’ – hence the status of matter as a mens momentanea, a
momentary mind that ‘contracts’ these independent instants in order to
exist (Deleuze 1994: 70). Before Kant, time had largely been defined by
succession, space by coexistence, and eternity by permanence. In Kant,
succession, simultaneity and permanence are all shown to be modes
or relations within the form of time: succession is the rule of what
is in different times; simultaneity is the rule of what is at the same
time; and permanence is the rule of what is for all times. Chapter 2 of
Difference and Repetition, entitled ‘Repetition for Itself’, analyses three
synthetic operations (habit, memory, the new) that generate time within
the pure and empty form, a profound transformation of the philosophy
of time. The liberation of time from its subordination to movement
is in turn the source of Deleuze’s conception of philosophy as the
creation of concepts, although it was not until What is Philosophy? that
Deleuze and Guattari would explicitly work out their own ‘analytic of
concepts’. Philosophy, art and science, they argue, are all determinations
of thought that take place within the pure form of time: from the infinite
variability of time, philosophers extract variations that converge as the
components of a consistent concept; scientists extract variables that enter
into determinable relations in a function; and artists extract varieties
(compounds of sensation) that enter into the composition of a work of
art. Philosophy, science and art are all productions of the new within
time, which leads to the final innovation that perhaps lies at the heart of
Deleuze’s work.
X. The Production of the New
Bergson wrote: ‘The more we study the nature of time, the more we
shall comprehend that duration means invention, the creation of forms,
the continual elaboration of the new’ (Bergson 1911: 14). Deleuze’s
final innovation is to have realised that this Bergsonian problem– the
conditions of the new– required the development of a philosophy of
difference. It seems paradoxical to ask about the conditions of the
new, since the new would already be given in its conditions. But
in Deleuze’s ‘transcendental empiricism’, the conditions of real (as
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opposed to merely possible) experience can be no larger than what
they condition and must thus be differential through and through. This
is why Deleuze replaces the traditional concept of possibility with the
new modal concept of the virtual. We tend to think that the possible
not only pre-exists the real but also resembles the real, and that the
process of ‘realisation’ simply involves a limitation or exclusion by
which certain possibilities are thwarted while others ‘pass’ into the real.
The theological presuppositions here are evident: everything is already
given, if only in infinite understanding of God (Leibniz). By contrast, the
virtual, as Deleuze formulates it, is not subject to a process of realisation,
but rather a process of actualisation, and the rules of actualisation are
not resemblance and limitation, but rather divergence and difference – in
other words, creation and novelty. A problem is a virtual multiplicity
that is completely differentiated; yet the ‘essence’ of a virtual multiplicity
is to actualise itself; but in being actualised, it differs from itself, it
necessarily becomes differenciated – that is, it produces difference, it is
the production of the new (the actual differs from the virtual). But
the actualisation that has just taken place in turn modifies the virtual
multiplicity, such that the actualisation of the virtual also produces the
virtual. The actual and the virtual, in other words, are like the recto and
verso of a single coin: the conditions and the conditioned are reciprocally
determined at one and the same time in a continuous variability (the pure
form of time).
No doubt other readers attempting to catalogue the innovations of
Difference and Repetition would produce quite different lists, precisely
because the text itself embodies the nature of a problematic multiplicity.
‘I believe in philosophy as system’, Deleuze once wrote.
Today it is said that systems are bankrupt, but it is only the concept of
system that has changed . . . For me, the system must not only be in perpetual
heterogeneity, it must be a heterogenesis – something which, it seems to me,
has never been attempted. (Martin 2010: 8; Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 9)
Heterogenesis: the perpetual genesis of the heterogeneous, an incessant
production of the new, the differentiation of difference. There is perhaps
no better characterisation of Difference and Repetition than this.
Notes
1. See Deleuze 1994: 195: ‘It must be remembered to what extent modern thought
and the renaissance of ontology is based upon the question-problem complex.’
2. Quine had proposed a similar need to start ‘in the middle’, although he
was referring to scientific theories rather than manifolds or multiplicities. See
48 Daniel W. Smith
Verhaegh 2018: 7: ‘As inquirers, we all have to start in the middle . . . We can
only improve, clarify, and understand the system “from within”.’
3. Leibniz similarly proposed a concept of the actual infinite that was opposed to
the indefinite: ‘I am so in favor of the actual infinite that instead of admitting
that Nature abhors it, as is commonly said, I hold that Nature makes use of
it everywhere, in order to show more effectively the perfections of its Author.
Thus I believe that there is no part of matter which is not, I do not say divisible,
but actually divided; and consequently the least particle ought to be considered
as a world full of an infinity of different creatures.’ Leibniz, Letter to Foucher,
16 March 1693 (Leibniz 1965: 416).
4. Leroi-Gourhan, in Gesture and Speech, discusses several modes of symboli-
sation, such as the notation of chemistry, that have resisted the ‘linearisation’
introduced by phonetic writing (Leroi-Gourhan 1993: 193).
5. See Goodman’s classic analyses of musical notation (Goodman 1976: 177–224);
painting, by contrast, has no notation.
6. ‘I take good care not to talk about chemical “laws”: that has a moral aftertaste
. . . ’ (Nietzsche 2003: 24). ‘The less we understand the laws of nature, that is,
the norms of life, the more we interpret them as orders and prohibitions – to the
point where the philosopher must hesitate before using the word “law,” so much
does it retain a moral aftertaste: it would be better to speak of “eternal truths”’
(Deleuze 1990: 268).
7. Russell makes this claim in his famous essay ‘On the Notion of Cause’: ‘It is not
in any sameness of causes and effects that the constancy of scientific law consists,
but in sameness of relations. And even “sameness of relations” is too simple a
phrase; “sameness of differential equations” is the only correct phrase’ (Russell
1910: 154).
8. Whitehead notes that ‘the variable, though undetermined, sustains its identity
throughout the arguments’ (Whitehead 1938: 106). Nietzsche poses the alternate
possibility: ‘logic is bound to the condition: assume there are identical cases’;
but ‘suppose there were no self-identical “A” such as is presupposed by every
proposition of logic (and of mathematics) . . . ’ (Nietzsche 1967: §512, 227;
§516, 279).
9. For an elucidation of calculus in terms of algebra, see Leibniz’s classic article,
‘Justification of the Infinitesimal Calculus by That of Ordinary Algebra’ (Leibniz
1956: 545–6).
10. For a brief summary of this history, Smith 2012: 290–4.
11. Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 9: ‘The death of metaphysics or the overcoming of
philosophy has never been a problem for us.’
12. For Porphyry’s tree, see Smith 2012: 39.
13. See Vuillemin 1954: 183: ‘Intensive magnitude appears immediately as the prior
condition of the extensive.’
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